Category Archives: Battles

Battles of the 1864 Valley Campaign

New Biography on Grumble Jones

At long last, Brig. Gen William E. “Grumble” Jones has his badly needed biography. James Ballard of Texas, formerly of Southwest Virginia, has stepped in and filled this historical void. I had an opportunity to interview him this past spring.

Here is the transcript:

What is the most revealing issue about Grumble Jones that you found in your research?

I would have to say that the most revealing issue about Grumble Jones was his unwavering support of the Lost Cause. In contrast to his future revered commander, Robert E. Lee and his future protege’, John Singleton Mosby, who both hoped that Virginia would remain with the Union, Jones assumed a hard-lined secessionist position long before the conflict began. In February of 1861, while Virginia was still with the Union, Jones corresponded to CSA President Davis declaring that in the event that Virginia chose to remain with the Union, he would renounce his allegiance to his home state and serve the new Confederacy. I feel that Jones stood with the Southern extremists who welcomed the Civil War.

Tell us about Jones how earned the nickname “the Stonewall Jackson” of East Tennessee.

According to author & source Scott Cole in his 34th Battalion Virginia Cavalry, Jones received this moniker from the Richmond Whig. Aside from the Chickamauga Campaign and a few other exceptions, the Confederacy enjoyed very little success in the entire state of Tennessee. East Tennessee, in particular, was pro-Union from the beginning of the conflict and provided bases of operations for potential Federal offenses against the mineral reserves in bordering Southwest Virginia (the salt-works at Saltville and the lead mines at Wythville). Jones’s overwhelming victories at Rogersville (TN), Jonesville (VA), and Wyerman’s Mill (VA), although minor engagements, alarmed the Federals into taking a defensive posture and shifting their priorities to defending their presence in Knoxville and the Cumberland Gap. Grumble’s triumphs in late 1863 and early 1864 thus served as a diversion to protect the Southwest Virginia mineral reserves much in the same manner as Jackson’s Valley Campaign of 1862 thwarted a Federal advance on Richmond. Upper East Tennessee remained under Confederate control until the fall of 1864 after the Jones Brigade of Southwest Virginia permanently withdrew from the region.

With the above said, Longstreet’s Corps occupied East Tennessee during that same period and contributed even more so to the security of Southwest Virginia. However, Longstreet’s failed Knoxville Campaign and the missed opportunity at Bean Station mark his presence with perhaps an unfair stigma of failure.

There seems to have been a tendency to establish the legendary Stonewall Jackson as a standard to be measured up against. In contrast to the Jones’s success in the region, CS Brigadier General Alfred E. Jackson, a kinsman to the legend, received the contra-distinct moniker of “Mudwall Jackson” for his failure in the Battle of Blue Springs that had secured East Tennessee for the Federals before Jones came on to the scene.

Jones’s reputation for parity with Stonewall Jackson was not limited to his operations in East Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. After the war, a former trooper praised Jones for the execution of his spring of 1863 West Virginia Raid with a parity to Jackson. While that expedition was in progress, Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Greg Curtin erroneously reported to President Lincoln that Stonewall Jackson was the Confederate commander conducting the raid with an exaggerated number of troops. In that campaign, Jones acted as a master of diversion. Heavily outnumbered and deep in enemy territory, Jones accomplished most of his objectives by deceiving the Federals and keeping them pinned down on the defensive.

What are your thoughts about the relationship between Jones and Stuart?

There is much irony in the adversarial relationship between Jones and Stuart, as the two Virginians had much in common. Both were raised in upper-middle-class families in the Appalachian Mountian region of rural western Virginia. Although their paths did not cross at either institution, both had academic ties to nearby Emory & Henry College and were members of the same literary society (later evolved into a social fraternity) before going on to West Point where both graduated in the upper portion of their respective classes. In spite of earning the privilege to choose other branches of the Old Army, both selected the mounted service, considered at their times to be the least desirable. The final eighteen months of Grumble’s service in the US Mounted Rifles overlapped the first eighteen months of Stuart’s tour of duty on the Texas frontier. Although they did not serve at the same garrisons, they probably grew familiar with each other while serving on special assignments such as court-martial duty.

Notwithstanding the similarities, there was a significant contrast between the experiences of Jones and Stuart in the Old Army. Jones’s eight years of service were marked with despair, isolation and personal tragedy. Stuart, on the other hand, enjoyed a tenure of glory, adventure, and romance. Married for less than ten weeks, Jones lost his wife to a drowning incident while in route to his new assignment in Texas. Stuart, conversely, married the daughter of his commanding officer and relished in a blissful marriage (in spite of his father-in-law’s loyalty to the Union) that lasted the remaining nine years of his life. Whether or not the contrast in fate contributed to the Jones’s animosity toward Stuart is up for speculation.

Early in the conflict, Jones went on record as resenting having to serve under Stuart who was nine years his junior in age. When Jones was a captain, Stuart was a colonel. With the same directive at promoted Jones to colonel, Stuart received the promotion to brigadier general. By the time Jones earned the rank of brigadier general, Stuart was already a major general.

There was an obvious personality conflict between the two generals. Stuart, the flamboyant extrovert thrived on the pomp and pageantry of martial displays, particularly demonstrated when he ordered the two grand reviews at Brandy Station. As Stuart’s antithesis, the low-profiled Jones was said to be contemptuous of such displays which he considered to be a waste of time and resources. Stuart was vain; Jones was proud.

The combination of personal animosities scalated from the outset. When the spring of 1862 field elections cost Jones command of the 1st VA Cavalry, he went on record accusing Stuart of unfairly influencing the outcome (how much that factored is not certain). Months later, Stuart unsuccessfully tried to dissuade Robert E. Lee from promoting Jones to brigadier general. For the time immediately following Jones’s promotion, Lee had the luxury of keeping the two generals separated, but when circumstances necessitated their rejoining, both resisted. Jones even offered his resignation in order to avoid returning to Stuart’s command.

It was apparent that Jones and Stuart disliked each other but with that said, Stuart praised Jones on several occasions. Sometimes, however, it was unclear whether Stuart intended to direct his praise toward Jones individually or to his troops. Also, whether or not those acclaims were attempts at reconciliation is up for speculation. During campaigns and in the preparation thereof, both seemed to put their personal differences aside.

The Jones- Stuart dispute came to a head at the conclusion of the Gettysburg Campaign when Jones submitted a “disrespectful letter” to Stuart. The content of that letter may never be known, but it led to Jones’s arrest, a court-martial conviction, and banishment from the Army of Northern Virginia, something both parties desired. To me, the content of that letter would be priceless. It placed Stuart in the rather awkward position of wanting to punish Jones for submitting the letter but while keeping the content confidential.

In spite of his personal disdain, Jones respected Stuart’s abilities as a commander. In a posthumous measure of reconciliation, Jones regarded Stuart’s death as detrimental to the Southern cause as the loss of Stonewall Jackson. With Jackson’s revered reputation as the standard, Jones labeled the late Stuart with the highest possible measure of praise. If nothing else, the Jones-Stuart relationship was complicated and could be a detailed study by itself.

Is Jones a forgotten hero at Brandy Station or does history give him full credit for his role?

There is no question that Jones’s decisive actions early in the engagement at Brandy Station ultimately allowed Stuart’s cavalry division to salvage a draw and avoid a complete disaster. With that said, the Battle of Brandy Station was too large of an engagement for one individual to receive a disproportionate share of credit for the successes or blame for the setbacks. Jones’s brigade was responsible for the security at Beverly’s Ford, and he had properly placed his horse artillery further back at St. James Church. Stuart’s report that the Jones Brigade “had the hardest of the fighting” was correct, but the unit happened to be positioned where the intense action occurred. Unlike Beverly Robertson’s brigade at Kelly’s Ford, Jones and his troops did their job and performed up to expectations. Although it may be somewhat of a reach to say that Jones receives “full” credit, I’m inclined to say that history gives him “proper” credit.

The nickname Grumble. I failed to find any wartime account calling him Grumble. The only thing close was an officer saying notwithstanding his grumbling he should be promoted. What did you find in the origins of that name? It seems to be more popular among modern historians than his fellow Confederates.

I agree that it is highly possible that the moniker of “Grumble” may have been designated by modern historians and not by persons of his time, even in their post-war writings. I have not seen any correspondence or reports from members of either side referring to Jones by that nickname. In his diary reflecting on the Battle of Piedmont, Private Charles H. Lynch of the 18th Connecticut Volunteers recalled that Jones’s nickname was “Billy.”

General Robert Ransom’s inspection report of April 24, 1864, remarked, “Jones ought to be promoted; notwithstanding all of his grumbling, he is a fine officer.” It was Jones’s last official evaluation before his death which would occur six weeks later. It is quite possible that the moniker was created and stood based on that report. If the reference to the moniker was something that was only privately spoken at the time, we have no way of knowing.

What do you think he would have accomplished if he had lived? Would he have made a difference in the Valley?

I have wondered about the scenario if Hunter had given up and retreated before Thoburn’s troops finally stormed the unoccupied gap in Jones’s lines. Jones would have survived and directed the brigades of Imboden and Vaughn to spearhead a pursuit. However, against DuPont’s effective artillery, any counter-offensive would have been a stalemate at best and a suicide mission at worst. I feel it is highly unlikely that Jones would have been able to drive Hunter’s forces beyond the North River. Conversely, the Federals would have maintained a formidable presence in the Valley just as they did following New Market. Hunter would then have had the option to march eastward, and that potential outcome is up to even broader speculation. Also, Staunton would have been exposed to Crooks Army of the Kanawha District approaching from the west. A Southern victory at Piedmont would have resulted in other difficulties.

In many ways, Hunter’s victory at Piedmont backfired as his overall Lynchburg Campaign was a failure. Aside from the attrition in the way Confederate losses, it did nothing to bring the war closer to a conclusion. Occupying Staunton was a temporary measure and torching VMI at Lexington served no purpose other than to arouse Southern resolve to retaliate. I’m of the feeling that the initial measures of Early’s Washington Raid, desperate as they were, were among the South’s finest moments of the war. I doubt that Jones’s presence would have extended the momentum beyond what it managed to accomplish before or after Grant appointed Phil Sheridan to launch his Shenandoah Valley Campaign.

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A Misrepresentation: Sheridan’s Reaction to Painting of Himself Riding the Battle Line At Cedar Creek

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When Sheridan saw this now widely publicized painting of himself riding along the line of battle to inspire the men at Cedar Creek and show that he had returned to the army, he reacted vociferously to its inaccuracies.

“Now just look,” said Sheridan, “and see how blank ridiculous that man has made me appear. Here I am represented as riding down the line with a flag in my hand and a whole regiment of cavalry as my escort. Why, blank, blank, blank, I made to appear like a blank fool. Now the truth is I rode down the line with ‘Tony’ Forsyth; that was all there was to it. No flag. No escort.”

Soon after, Sheridan read an article describing his reaction to the artwork. His response:  “I wouldn’t have cared so much about it except that [it] makes me swear so [much]. People will think I am in the habit of swearing. Why, blank, blank, blank, you that isn’t so.”

Note that “Tony Forsyth” was Col. James Forsyth Sheridan’s Chief-of-Staff. The ride along the battle line had been the brainchild of another staff officer, Major George “Sandy” Forsyth (no relation to James)  had been the one who suggested that Sheridan show himself to the men when he returned to the Army at Cedar Creek.

Sheridan’s appearance along the line of battle rejuvenated the rank and file of the Army of the Shenandoah. Lt. Col. Moses Granger of the 122nd Ohio, Sixth Army Corps recalled the scene:

General Sheridan came riding along the line, just in my rear, as I was sitting on a stump, he drew rein, returned our salutes, gave a quick look at the me, and said, ‘You look all right, boys! We’ll whip’em like h–l before night.’ At this hearty cheers broke out, and he rode on passing from the rear to the front of our line through the right-wing of my regiment, and thence westward followed ever by cheers.”

Instantly all thought of merely defeating an attack upon us ended. In its stead was a conviction that we were to attack and defeat them that very afternoon. All were sure that “Little Phil” would make it impossible for the enemy to turn our flank, and easy for us to turn theirs.”

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The Battle of Lynchburg

The fighting at Lynchburg late in the afternoon of June 17, 1864 pitted infantry from General George Crook’s division against the Confederate cavalry brigades of Col. William Peters, (Grumble Jones former command); Col. William “Mudwall” Jackson and Gen. John Imboden under the overall command of the latter.

The Southern Cavalry deployed just west of Lynchburg near an old Quaker meeting house. Imboden checked the advance of Gen. William Averell’s cavalry who turned the fight over to Crook. He promptly attacked and drove back the Confederate horsemen. The History of the 91st Ohio Infantry provides a descriptive recollection of the first day’s battle at Lynchburg:

“June 17, we arrived within six miles of Lynchburg by 10 A.M. and rested until 3 P.M. We then moved to attack the rebels. The 91st Regiment was in the front line of battle, just to the right of the main pike leading into the city. It support in the second line of battle was the 9th West Virginia ; the 12th Ohio was on the right of the 91stt in the front line. On either side of the pike there were woods to protect the troops in their advance except immediately on the right and directly in front of the 91st, here was an open field through which the 91st was compelled to charge, an in which the rebels had built rail pens.  As the 91st  emerged from the woods into this field, they found themselves upon an elevated part of the field where the rebels played upon them with their artillery. In the middle of this field was a depression, and tat the farther side was another elevation upon which the rebel artillery was placed.

It seemed a terrible ordeal to attempt the passage of this field while the artillery frowned death and those rail pens were filled with angry rebels.  Not withstanding, the 91st charged over this field and through a terrible storm of shot and shell, driving the rebels from their defense, capturing two pieces of artillery, and pressing their entire line back to their inner line of defenses. We had the misfortune in this engagement to lose our commanding officer. Col. Turley was severely wounded while in the discharge of his duty, and lt. Col. Coates succeeded to the command of the regiment.”

The 91st Ohio was well supported in its assault and did not act alone, being joined in the attack by Col. Jacob Campbell’s brigade of Pennsylvanians and West Virginians as well as the troops noted in the history. Although the attack was successful, the opportunity to capture Lynchburg had been lost thanks to the bold delaying actions of Confederate Brig. Gen. John C. McCausland, who had contested Hunter’s advance from the moment he left Staunton, to Lexington, at Buchanan, over the Blue Ridge and on the road to Lynchburg. McCausland bought the time needed for Lt. Gen. Jubal Early to arrive late in town late in the afternoon of June 17, with the vanguard of the Army of Northern Virginia’s vaunted Second Corps. As Imboden’s horsemen retreated in confusion toward Lynchburg pursued by Crook’s infantry, Early led Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur’s division forward to restore the line. Shaking his fist in the air, “Old Jube” shouted defiantly to the Federals (and derisively toward Imboden’s beaten troopers as well), “No more buttermilk rangers after you now, damn you!?

Early’s arrival saved Lynchburg from Hunter’s grasp. The vital rail and supply center would remain securely in Confederate hands.

For more on the 1864 Valley Campaign read:

Shenandoah Summer       Layout 1

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The Lynchburg Campaign: Brig. Gen. William Averell’s Report of Operations

MAY 26- JUNE 29, 1864–The Lynchburg Campaign.
No. 22.–Report of Brig. Gen. William W. Averell, U.S. Army, commanding Second Cavalry Division.

HDQRS. SECOND CAV. DIV., DEPT. OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Charleston, W. Va., July 1, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the cavalry under my command since the 1st ultimo:
On the 1st of June my division, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-General Duffié, Colonel Schoonmaker, and Col. J. H. Oley, was encamped at Bunger’s Mills, Greenbrier County, waiting for supplies from Charleston of horses, shoes, clothing, &c. Crook’s division crossed the river on that day, leaving me to bring up my detachments and supplies, which did not arrive.
On the 2d Mr. David Creigh, a citizen of Lewisburg, was tried by a military commission and found guilty of murdering a Union soldier in November last. The proceedings were subsequently approved and Mr. Creigh was hanged at Belleview on Friday, the 10th of June. The detachments and supplies for which we had so long waited failing to arrive, I followed Crook’s division on the 3d to White Sulphur Springs with 3,200 mounted and 1,200 dismounted men; 600 men were without shoes, and many other articles of clothing were much needed. From the 18th of May until this day we had waited near Lewisburg upon half rations, most of the time for necessary supplies of horseshoes, nails, and clothing; but owing to the miserable, inadequate, and insufficient transportation furnished from the Kanawha we were obliged to set out again almost as destitute as when we arrived. The march from Sulphur Springs to Staunton was made in five days via Morris’ Hill, Warm Springs, Goshen, and Middlebrook. My barefooted men suffered terribly, but without complaint on this march. At Staunton the much needed supplies were received.

 

On the 9th Brigadier-General Duffié was placed in command of the First Cavalry Division and my own was reorganized as follows, viz: First Brigade, Colonel Schoonmaker–Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Eighth Ohio; Second Brigade, Colonel Oley–Seventh West Virginia Cavalry, Thirty-fourth Ohio Volunteer Mounted Infantry, Third West Virginia Cavalry, Fifth West Virginia Cavalry; Third Brigade, Colonel Powell–First West Virginia Cavalry, Second West Virginia Cavalry. The Third West Virginia Cavalry was assigned temporarily to the division of Crook and has remained with it since.

 

At the request of the major-general commanding the department, on the 9th I submitted a plan of operations the purpose of which was the capture of Lynchburg and the destruction of railroads running from that place in five days. The plan proposed the movement of Sullivan’s, Crook’s, and my own division by different roads up the Valley, while the division of Duffié, after threatening the position of the enemy at Rockfish Gap, was to pass southward along the western base of the Blue Ridge, making demonstrations at the various gaps, sending scouting parties to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and to arrive at Buena Vista Furnace, on Jackson River, at the close of the second day. On the third day he was to move through White’s Gap to Amherst Court-House, destroying the railroad, sending a detachment of his division toward Lynchburg for that purpose, while he proceeded with his main body across the James River below Lynchburg and destroyed the South Side Railroad east of the city, his entire division forming a junction with the corps of Major-General Hunter south of Lynchburg. The plan was approved and adopted, and orders were issued covering the operation for the first day. By direction of the major-general commanding I gave to Brigadier-General Duffié complete and comprehensive verbal instructions with regard to the route he was to take and the services his division was to render. He was also furnished with memoranda to assist his memory.

 

On the 10th my division marched via Summerdean to Belleview, on Hays Creek, with little opposition, communicating with Crook at Brownsburg, two and one-half miles to the east. Efforts were made to cut off the rebel force of McCausland, which had attempted to make a stand against Crook on the Brownsburg pike. Taking the route via Cedar Grove, on the 11th my division crossed North River at the Rockbridge Bath and endeavored again to cut off McCausland, who had burned the bridge at Lexington, and was opposing the crossing of Crook. The enemy, however, avoided the danger by a hasty flight and the town of Lexington fell into the hands of my division with little or no resistance.

 

No communication having been received from General Duffié, I sent scouts to find him during the evening of the 11th and the ensuing day, which time was wasted in waiting to hear from him. Fearing he might fail in the execution of the most important part of his work, I dispatched 200 men, under Lieutenant Grim, First West Virginia Cavalry, and Lieutenant Kerr, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, on the evening of the 12th, from Lexington through White’s Gap, via Amherst Court-House and around Lynchburg, to destroy the railroad. The perilous duty assigned to these officers was most gallantly performed, and they rejoined their regiments on the 15th. The report of Lieutenant Grim is inclosed.

 

At 2 a.m. on the 13th my division moved toward Buchanan, driving McCausland in disorder across the James River. He was pursued the last eight miles to Buchanan at a gallop, my advance endeavoring to save the bridge at that place, but the flying forces of McCausland set it on fire before he himself had crossed, obliging him to ford the river to escape capture. Two brigades were immediately thrown across to a fruitless pursuit. Several bateaux, loaded with provisions and stores, were captured near this town. Two of my scouts who had been sent to Duffié the day previous returned, having fallen in with a reconnoitering party of the enemy ten miles from Lexington, from the commanding officer of which they received a dispatch to bear to Breckinridge, a copy of which is inclosed.(*) A spy from the enemy who came into my camp soon after my arrival was killed by my order. I soon received a notification from the major-general commanding that he should remain that day at Lexington, and instructions to wait for his arrival at Buchanan.

 

The 14th was occupied in destroying some important iron furnaces in the neighborhood of Fincastle. On the 15th my division followed Crook’s over the Blue Ridge between the Peaks of Otter to Fancy Farm, where General Crook, having received information that Breckinridge was at Balcony Falls, desired me to wait until the arrival of the main body, as our left flank would be too much exposed. The brigade of Colonel Powell was sent forward to Liberty, and the country in that direction was most thoroughly scouted by him that evening. Scouts were sent to Lynchburg and every other direction.

 

The following morning my command pushed on through Liberty, rebuilt the bridge over Little Otter River, forded Big Otter, and attacked McCausland at New London about dark. He had been re-enforced by Imboden with 400 men and two guns, but relinquished his position after a short action, in which he lost about a dozen men.

 

At sunrise on the 17th my command moved by the old road toward Lynchburg, some two miles to the right of Crook, who moved on the direct road from New London. The enemy resisted our advance at every step after arriving within eight miles of the city, but it was not until we came in sight of the stone church, four miles from Lynchburg, that he seemed determined to give battle. I constantly advised General Crook of my progress, and after a brief reconnaissance of the position, opened the attack. The ground was difficult for cavalry, and its peculiar formation made the following disposition necessary: Schoonmaker’s brigade furnished a strong skirmish line, mounted, across the open ground, supported by squadrons with intervals in columns of fours, open order, ready to charge or dismount to fight: Oley’s brigade on the right in column, Powell’s on the left, in the same order. The enemy retired as the attack was developed, with very little skirmishing, but as it approached the crest of the hill upon which the church stands a rapid artillery fire was opened upon us, and their small-arms became unmasked. Schoonmaker’s and Oley’s brigades dismounted and ran to the front; the section of artillery with my division galloped up to the church, supported by Powell, and opened its fire. The enemy signally failed in his ruse to draw us into a position from which he expected to drive us. After a short but sharp contest he was driven nearly a mile toward Lynchburg. Crook brought up two brigades, which were soon deployed and advanced to the support of my line, and two of his batteries also arrived at the front. The enemy, driven to his field-works, received re-enforcements, and confidently advanced to charge my line. Had the infantry support been in position, to have carried on our success, then we might have achieved some important advantages. As it was my line had a hard struggle to maintain its position until the infantry arrived, but with it came the dusk of evening, and although the boldness of the enemy was severely punished, our attack was delayed until the morning.

 
During the night, by the direction of the major-general commanding, efforts were made to communicate with Duffié, who had lost himself on the extreme left. Scouting parties were also sent to obtain information from the city. Re-enforcements continually arrived to the enemy. On the following morning Duffié was found and ordered to attack on the Forest road. Two hundred men under Captain Duncan, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, were sent to the enemy’s extreme left to harass him, and, if possible, destroy the railroad. Later Powell’s brigade was sent to attack the enemy at the Campbell Court-House road.
The enemy busied himself with throwing up earth-works during the night of the 17th and the day of the 18th, until 4 p.m., when he advanced from his works, making an attack, which was quickly repulsed. Schoonmaker’s brigade was placed in position during the action, but was not called upon to enter it. Oley was looking out for the rear and left. It was evident that too many lives must be expended to carry the enemy’s position. The morrow would find him in a condition to assume the offensive, if not already so. The delay at Lexington, rendered necessary by the deviation of the First Cavalry Division from the course ordered for it, and the change of place made by ordering it to join the main body, instead of going around Lynchburg, had proved fatal to the successful execution of the original project.
The orders of the major-general commanding to withdraw westward along the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad left me as rear guard of the column, which position was maintained until our arrival at Liberty. Between the Big

and Little Otter Rivers I received orders from the major-general commanding to make a movement upon the Danville railroad, which were suspended soon after at Liberty. Upon the arrival of the army at the latter place it halted to rest west of the town. I had requested that a brigade of infantry be left to support me, anticipating an attack from the indications in rear; but my request was not granted, and unaided my division stood the brunt of a severe attack for two hours. Schoonmaker’s brigade especially distinguished itself by its obstinate resistance. My ammunition failing, the division was withdrawn behind Crook’s, which had been formed in line of battle a mile in the rear. My loss in this severe engagement was 122.
At 3 a.m. the 20th the march was resumed in the direction of Buford’s Gap. Scouts had informed us that a heavy force of cavalry had passed the night before to the northward in the direction of the Peaks of Otter. Arrived west of the gap, my division was placed in position in connection with Crook’s to enable the troops to rest and refresh themselves. At sundown the column was again in motion toward Salem, Duffié division in advance of the trains, and my own in rear, with the exception of Powell’s brigade, which was left with General Crook in rear. Staff officers were sent forward to direct General Duffié to picket strongly all the side reads until the column had passed. At Bonsack’s Station no picket was found on the road to Fincastle, and scouts sent by me upon that road reported a cavalry force of the enemy moving in the direction of Salem. An officer was dispatched to General Duffié with directions to take a strong position near that place, and patrol a distance of four miles upon every road leading to it.
I received during the night an order from the major-general commanding to send the train on at once from Salem upon the road to New Castle, but not feeling assured that the road indicated had been properly patroled, I postponed the execution of the order until my arrival at Salem, to which place I hastened, finding the division of Duffié asleep among the wagons at daylight, with one brigade in the village and pickets only just outside. Without leaving my saddle I roused one of his regiments and sent it at once upon the New Castle road, with orders to attain the summit of Catawba Mountain, seven miles from Salem, and await further orders. Immediately after it I sent one of his brigades to support it. I directed the two brigades of my division with me to be posted opposite the Fincastle road to await the attack of the approaching enemy. It was soon reported from Duffié’s advance that the New Castle road was blockaded. I directed him to take his entire division present and proceed to clean out the gap and hold it until the column had passed, placing a regiment upon the summit of Catawba Mountain to hold that position. The wagon train followed him. The cavalry of the enemy at this time attacked my brigades on the Fincastle road, but were repulsed. The action could have been made much more decisive in our favor had General Sullivan granted assistance, for which he was vainly importuned, although he had a brigade within a few hundred yards of the scene. Meeting the major-general commanding upon my return from the flank, I represented to him the necessity for resting and refreshing the troops, explaining to him the arrangements which had been made and the positions taken, all of which he approved, directing provisions to be cooked in the town, and the artillery and troops to bivouack. Shortly after it was reported that the enemy had attacked our trains in the gap, and later that he had captured some pieces of artillery. Who had started the artillery upon the road or who knew that it was not in camp as had been directed, I am unable to say. With the brigades of Colonel Schoonmaker and Oley the enemy was soon routed in a brilliant manner, the guns retaken and several of the enemy killed and captured. It was found upon proceeding through the gap that General Duffié had neglected to observe any of the instructions he had received. Not a single precaution had been taken by him to prevent the attack which had occurred, and not a regiment nor a man had been left by him upon the summit of Catawba Mountain, but pushing northward he was only halted by a staff officer sent by me. During the night of the 21st my division followed the First to New Castle, guarding the roads leading to the east and west until the main body had passed. The march thence to this place via Sweet Springs White Sulphur Springs, and Lewisburg was made without incident. The officers and men suffered greatly from hunger, but no complaint was heard. From White Sulphur Springs the Eighth Ohio Cavalry was sent to overtake and accompany a train to Beverly which had left us on the 16th at Liberty.
I beg leave to commend for enterprise and activity, for an intelligent and faithful execution of orders, Lieutenant Grim, First West Virginia Cavalry, and Lieutenant Kerr, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. Captain Winger, Eighth Ohio Cavalry, elicited the admiration and encomiums of his comrades by his daring gallantry in the attack in front of Lynchburg. Colonels Schoonmaker and Moore in front of Liberty behaved with great credit. Colonel Powell proved himself at all times a capable brigade commander.
WM. W. AVERELL.
Lieut. Col. CHARLES G. HALPINE,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Department of West Virginia.

 

For more on Averell and the 1864 Valley Campaign see:

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The 1st Tennessee Cavalry at the Battle of Piedmont

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June 5, 2014 · 7:58 pm

The Battle of Piedmont: Account by Adjutant Caldwell, 12th West Virginia Infantry

On the 18th of May, our regiment and the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts with two pieces of artillery moved from Cedar Creek, five or six miles up the Valley to Fisher’s Hill, and occupied it as a picket. Gen. Sigel came out to our camp there. The next day the two regiments fell back two or three miles to Strasburg and occupied an old fort there built by Gen. Banks. We received today mail – always a welcome receipt to the boys, the first since leaving Winchester, ten days before. In the evening the Thirty-fourth band came to the headquarters of the Twelfth to give us a serenade. Speeches were made by Col. Curtis, Adjt. Caldwell and Capt. Smiley of our regiment.

 

On the 2nd, Gen. Sigel was relieved from command here and Gen. Hunter assigned to his place. Three days later we were reinforced at Cedar Creek by three more regiments of infantry, the Second Maryland, the Fourth Virginia and the One Hundred and Sixtieth Ohio, and about this time, or a little later we were further reinforced by the Fifth New York Heavy artillery.

 

On the 25th, we drew ten days’ rations of coffee and sugar and three days’ rations of hard bread. The troops from Cedar Creek came up, all having had marching orders. We were now about to start on the memorable campaign against Lynchburg. Hunter had issued his famous order announcing to his troops that they were about to enter on an explosion of hardships, in which they would have to live off the enemy, and if need be to eat mule meat. The infantry were required to carry each man 80 or 100 rounds of ammunition. A little after noon of this day the great march began of what was known as Hunter’s raid. We camped in the evening near Woodstock. On the way the cavalry burned a house and barn, by orders of Gen. Hunter, the owner having been engaged in bushwhacking.

 

On the 29th we resumed our march passing through Edinburg and Mount Jackson, crossing the Shenandoah here on a bridge newly built by the Rebels to replace the one burnt by Sigel and camped near New Market and the ground of the battle of two weeks before. Some members of the regiment looked over the battle field. They found that our dead had been buried in a heap where some stone had been quarried out. The dead of the enemy that had not been taken to their homes, had been buried in the cemetery at New Market. The enemy had left 31 of our wounded at this town and vicinity, who it had appeared had been quite well taken care of. This night our regiment went on picket on the bridge over the river in our rear. The second day after our arrival here, two companies of the Twelfth I and K were detailed to fill in with stone the wodden abuttments of the bridge, and the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts went out foraging; thus making a beginning of living off the enemy.

 

We remained here until June 2nd, when we marched at 5 o’clock A. M. our regiment in the rear of the wagon train, arriving at Harrisburg in the evening, our advance having driven Imboden out of town. The Rebels left some sixty of our wounded and thirty of theirs here, brought up from New Market. Distance marched this day 24 miles.

 

On the 4th, we marched from here taking the pike leading to Staunton, but Hunter finding Imboden posted about seven miles ahead at Mount Crawford after examining this position, turned to the left taking a side road leading via Port Republic. Seven miles from Harrisburg we came to Cross Keys where the forces of Fremont and Jackson fought on June 8th, 1862, and a little farther on to where the Rebel Col. Ashy was killed. At Port Republic on the south branch of the Shenandoah our pioneers put a pontoon bridge over the river on which we crossed and marched about one mile on the road leading to Staunton.

 

Early in the morning of the 5th, we resumed our march, but did not go far until our cavalry began skirmishing with the Rebels, driving them and capturing a number of prisoners. It may be well to say here that an Irish woman, who accompanied the First New York cavalry was noticed helping tenderly to bury some of the killed “my (her) boys” of that regiment that morning.
Seven miles from Port Republic we found the Rebels in force, consisting of the commands of Generals Vaughn and Imboden, and a number of militia, numbering in all, as learned from prisoners, between 8,000 and 9,000 men, all under the command of Gen. W. E. Jones. Hunter’s command consisted in all of 8,500 men, the infantry in two brigades the First commanded by Col. Moor, and the Second by Col. Thoburn. The cavalry were under command of Gen. Stahl, the infantry under Gen. Sullivan.

 

The enemy were posted on either side of the pike their right drawn back somewhat. They had breastworks of rails extending at least from the pike to the Middle river on their left, several hundred yards distant. Hunter made disposition for battle at once, and the engagement that followed is known as the Battle of Piedmont. The First Brigade was formed on the right of the pike, and the Second Brigade on the left. The opposing forces faced each other from either side from the edge of woods, with several hundred yards of cleared land between.

 

The battle began. It was opened by the artillery from each side. The Twelfth and the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts of Thoburn’s brigade were ordered forward through the woods, on the left of the pike with a view to charging some of the enemy’s artillery; when being discovered they were vigorously shelled by the enemy. After awhile they were brought back to the point where they had entered the woods. While waiting here for the coming of the balance of their brigade Colonels Thoburn and Curtis and Adjt. G. B. Caldwell with their orderlies, rode out into the open ground forming a group, for the purpose of watching the effect of the artillery fire. They were discovered by the Rebels, who threw a shell right into their midst, which exploding took off the fore-leg of the Adjutant’s little mare. That group immediately dispersed.

 

The other regiments having come up, Col Thoburn moved his brigade forward in the open ground into a slight hollow, within 200 yards of the enemy for the purpose of making a flank charge upon him. While the infantry were moving forward into this position, the artillery on each side opened up a heavy fire, and the Rebel band played “Dixie,” while ours played “Yankee Doodle.” Just before the charge that gallant young officer Capt. Meigs, of Hunter’s staff rode backward and forward along the line encouraging the men to do their duty on this charge, and the day would be ours, that they must not hesitate or falter but go right through, that we were now a hundred miles from our lines, and that defeat would be disastrous. The First Brigade had made three charges right in the face of the Rebel front and had been repulsed. But we will let Adjt. G. B. Caldwell of the Twelfth tell the story of the battle in his graphic and enthusiastic way, as it came red hot from his pen a few days after for the Wheeling Intelligencer; or more particularly of the part taken in the engagement by the Twelfth. The letter was written from the headquarters of the regiment at Staunton and is as follows:

 

This regiment moved from camp at Port Republic at 6 o’clock A. M., June 5, 1864. Our forces marching forward towards Staunton some four miles, our cavalry became engaged and drove the enemy a distance of one and a half miles, suffering a loss of thirty, killed and wounded. Capt. Imboden a brother of the general’s was taken here. The ball then opened by the loud mouthed artillery bellowing forth, both Union and Rebel in hellish dialogue of the death answering each other’s thunderous salutations. Post the crackling and roaring of Rebel woolen factories, consumed by flames kindled by the land of Union retributive justice; past the roaring batteries; past Carlin’s braves stripped to the shirt sewing out iron vengeance to traitors, the Second Brigade, our fearless, cool and sound-judging Col. Joe Thoburn commanding, marched a mile to the very front, forming the left of our force. The position was 150 yards from the Rebel lines drawn tip behind a fortification of fence rails, so arranged as to make perfect protection against musketry. Here for one hour and a half in a woods at one and one-half miles range, the two twenty pounder Parrott guns of the enemy were served entirely against us with all possible rapidity and great precision, amid the tremendous explosion of shell, the profuse of rain of case shoe the fall of trees and limbs, amid wounded and dying among all these combinations of horror, with not a gun fired by us and no excitement to cause a wild carelessness of danger, our line never wavered.

 

The first Brigade (our right) being heavily pressed moved us in retreat perhaps half a mile undetected by the enemy. This manouver was admirably masked in the woods like our advance before in the morning. A wide hollow whose descending sides were open fields stretched between the First and Second Brigades. Across this we must go. Our batteries open their fiercest fire, from hill to hill leap the ponderous black messengers of destruction, the reverberations of half a hundred, guns, on both sides, brought into action by the endeavor our batteries make to attract the attention of the enemy’s ordnance, make earth tremble, and the air roar while we run the fiery gauntlet to reinforce our right. With unbroken lines we march over with steady tread.

 

The Rebels occupy a woods in whose edge they have as on their right, an admirably impromptu fence barricaded. Up we go to within 100 yards, lie down, fire and draw the Rebel fire. Men are struck all along the line. Most of the enemy’s rifles are empty. Springing to their feet and cheering wildly the men rush forward and over the parapet. Our color bearer plants that banner of holy hopes and hallowed memories right where the sheet of Rebel flame runs crackling along, and mounting up cries, “Come on boys here’s where I want you.” Gloriously forward we go right into the woods our flag the first our regiment the foremost, the Rebels contending in a hand to hand struggle. Prisoners stream to the rear by the hundreds. Other regiments come to our support.

 

The character of the conflict is attested by bayoneted Rebel dead. The emblematic rags of treason their battle flags, a few minutes before planted in the dirt. They flee in utter rout and one wild shout of “Victory is ours!” runs along for more than a mile through infantry, artillery, cavalry, through stragglers and wagon trains, till the very wounded in the hospitals cheer again and again. The conduct of the men cannot be too much praising. Often a soldier would press forward so furiously as to be enclosed single-handed among a mass of Rebels, surrendering to be recaptured instantly by his advancing comrades. The whole Rebel force having fled, we camped for the night in the woods among the Rebel dead, too numerous to be buried till the morrow.

 

Thirty ambulances constantly running with the attendants, cannot collect all the wounded into hospitals, even in the long hours of this summer afternoon and evening. They have from two to three to our one in killed and wounded, and 1,000 able bodied prisoners, 60 officers, four or five colonels, Brig. Gen. Jones, their commanded killed, 1,700 stand of arms, four or five stand of colors and last and best Staunton grace our triumph.

 

 

Corp Joseph Halstead, 12th West Virginia Inf. W. B. Curtis Collection, WVU

Corp Joseph Halstead, 12th West Virginia Inf.
W. B. Curtis Collection, WVU

And here let me pause to pay a tribute to the memory of one of our own country’s martyrs in our holy cause, our color bearer Corporal Joseph S. Halstead. A braver spirit never bore the banner of beauty and glory forward amid the bursting shells and the leaden rain of death. With comrades falling all around him he went ahead of the bravest, ahead of his brigade. The head and front of that terrific charge into the jaws of death, he rushed forward and planted our flag on the very parapet sheeted with flames from the enemy’s rifles. Then over and forward again goes our banner into the hand to hand conflict in which that glorious day’s fate was decided. He falls at last, but if there be consolation in such an hour, and to a Christian and one so wholly a soldier as he, he has it to the full a knowledge of his country’s glory and his own. In the moment of victory with a broken and dispirited enemy flying before us with the shouts of comrades drunk with the enthusiasm of the hour rendering the very sky, with the valor of our arms attested by the piles of grey-clothed dead and hurt around him with the deep heart-felt admiration of all, attracted by his surpassing daring, with his comrades standing around him in speechless and tearful sympathy, with prisoners streaming or crowding to the rear, colonels and subordinates in traitor regalia, their perjured leader stricken dead by loyal vengeance, he fell at the very acme of our triumph, battling the flag which be had borne so royally to glory and to victory, with blood as noble as ever coursed through patriot veins. Poor Halstead among the brave the choicest spirit of them all, long will his memory be cherished and his valor in that, hour of carnage and triumph be the theme of the bivonac talks of his comrades.

 

Col. William B. Curtis 12th West Virginia Inf W. B. Curtis Collection WVU

Col. William B. Curtis
12th West Virginia Inf
W. B. Curtis Collection
WVU

Col. Curtis had the pleasure of receiving the sword of a Virginia regiment’s colonel, whose surrender he demanded. One of our Marshall county boys had the honor of bringing a Rebel colonel “to time.” He, the Marshall county boy is a young fellow of about 17. Another from Hancock county, I. N. Cullen, (Comp.) had a grey header Confed bring a musket to his breast with an order to surrender. He threw the musket aside and twisted it out of the old fellow’s hands, then kicking him over the parapet and out of the woods saying, “Old man you’re too old for me to bayonet.” Another Ohio county boy mounted the parapet in the charge and looking down on the Rebs, says “Lookout Johnnys we’re coming down on you like a thousand of brick” That was funny at such a time – It was “in the cool.”

 

In the morning before the fight, Gen. Jones drew his men tip and told them that we were going to avenge Fort Pillow, that to surrender would be to die; and such stuff for an hour. If anything was wanting to prove the superior humanity of the Union soldiers or the barbarism induced in the South by slavery here it might have been found. First Sergeant Hart Marks, of Company K, accepted the surrender of a Rebel lieutenant and passed on to the front. The Rebel drew a revolver from under his coat and shot him, fortunately slightly, in the back, yet our boys spared him. I know of more such cases, several. Marks shortly afterwards received two wounds, one in side, and one in the shoulder, the last having passed through a twisted blanket, while charging the woods, the Rebels being behind the trees. Another of our regiment, the eccentric Barney Wyles, pressed ahead too far and was surrounded; he surrendered but his captor shot at him after surrender, with a revolver, cutting his clothes. Our men rushed on him, wrested the revolver from him, and then spared him. All evening could you see Union soldiers feeding wounded Rebels, and food was scarce with us then, having to come all in the shape of forage. In every regiment a number of instances can be given of such treachery as above. Could any contrast be greater?


For more on the battle of Piedmont see:

197.0 Piedmont Battle

 

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John D. Imboden: Misrepresenting History and Southern Soldiers Who Fought at Piedmont

Gen. John D. Imboden wrote about the battle of Piedmont to protray himself as a victim and the Confederate Forces who fought there as being incapable of victory. Unfortunately, he misrepresented the truth about the composition of the Confederate forces at Piedmont. In the process, thousands of regular Confederate soldiers were denied their place in history, because Imboden’s widely circulated writings have been overly relied upon by historians. In the following text, where Imboden is quoted, his false assertions will appear in italics.

Gen. John D. Imboden

In his post-war writings on the campaign, Imboden recalled organizing the troops sent him from Southwest Virginia on June 3 and wrote of the troops who joined him:
To my dismay, I learned from officers in command of the detachments arriving that no large organized body of troops was on its way to join me except Vaughan’s small Tennessee brigade of cavalry. Jones had cleaned out the hospitals from Lynchburg to Bristol of convalescents, and gathered them together with the depot guards along the railroad, aggregating all told less than 2,200 men. The largest organization was no more than a battalion, not a single complete regiment was coming on, except as stated, Vaughan’s brigade of about 800 men. Mostly they were in companies, and parts of companies.
This statement contained several misleading assertions which short-changed the Virginians, Tennesseans and North Carolinians who bore the brunt of the coming battle. General Imboden left the impression that his assertions applied to the army as a whole. Unfortunately, this post-war account appeared in the widely read Confederate Veteran and heavily influenced future interpretation of the battle of Piedmont.
Imboden’s statement that no unit larger than a battalion is an outright fabrication. In reality, General William E. Jones generously sent Imboden several organized infantry regiments. The 36th, 45th and 60th Virginia Infantry regiments numbered a minimum of five hundred men each. The Thomas Legion contained 390 men. The 45th Virginia Battalion numbered only 150 men but consisted of only five companies. These men were not Valley soldiers, however, they resided in Southwest Virginia and Counties that became West Virginia in 1863 and were not part of the usual Valley armies prior to June 5, 1864.

When Imboden’s account appeared in a Staunton newspaper, word of it filtered back to a veteran of the 45th Virginia. The veteran took Imboden to task and informed the paper’s editor of his oversight in leaving out the Virginia infantry. Jones also sent approximately five hundred dismounted cavalrymen from his own brigade to the Valley, but these proved the exception rather than the rule, as Imboden implied in his narrative.
Imboden also claimed that he appointed the acting brigadiers and organized the brigades. Most reinforcements already belonged to existing organizations. The 36th and 60th Virginia, the 45th Battalion and Bryan’s Lewisburg Battery belonged to an officially recognized brigade, formerly commanded by Colonel John C. McCausland. This brigade retained its organization under the command of Colonel Beuhring Jones at Piedmont, and Imboden clearly played no role in its creation and organization.

Imboden possibly organized the 45th Virginia, General William E. Jones’ dismounted men and the Thomas Legion into a brigade com-manded by Colonel William E. Browne. On the other hand, the 45th Virginia and the Thomas Legion had formed part of the Saltville garrison which Browne had previously commanded.

Imboden did indeed organize the convalescents from the hospitals and the Maryland Line into a battalion, organized a medical department and called up a regiment of local reserves before any rein¬forcements arrived. Quite clearly, General Imboden organized some of the troops, but he misled his audience when he de-scribed the nature of the troops from the Department of South-western Virginia and East Tennessee.
Imboden also stated that the troops at Piedmont were strangers to one another and had never fought together before. To some limited extent this held true, but the infantry which did the bulk of the fighting had much shared experience. The 45th Virginia previously had fought side by side with McCausland’s Brigade at Cloyd’s Mountain. Before that, the Virginians fought together in several Western Virginia campaigns. Some familiarity definitely existed in the Confederate ranks at Piedmont.
Imboden further exaggerated the situation when he described the “heterogeneous materials” which composed the Confederate army at Piedmont. He wrote that the Southern soldiers “touched elbows with strangers, and obeyed orders from, to them, unknown and unfamiliar lips.” While Vaughn’s brigade, the Virginia Infantry and Imboden’s cavalry had not fought together as an army previously, the units within each brigade were well acquainted with each other. The companies and regiments had been together for most of their service, and the officers who commanded them at Piedmont knew their men well. Imboden’s exaggerations por-trayed the Confederate Army at Piedmont as one which had little chance to achieve victory. In truth, General Jones had assembled a formidable force of infantry and dismounted cavalry given the exigency of his situation. And he did so in a remarkably short period at a time when the Confederacy was hard pressed across all fronts.

Jones and the men who did most of the fighting at Piedmont deserved better than Gen. John D. Imboden gave them.

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